Medical errors as a result of specialization  by Hashem, Ahmad et al.
www.elsevier.com/locate/yjbin
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 61–69Medical errors as a result of specialization
Ahmad Hashem,a,* Michelene T.H. Chi,b and Charles P. Friedmanc
a Healthcare Industry Solutions Group, Microsoft Corporation, One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052, USA
b Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, 3939 O’Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
c Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh, Forbes Tower, Suite 8084 200 Lothrop Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2582, USA
Received 8 July 2003Abstract
Errors in medicine result in over 44,000 preventable deaths annually. Some of these errors are made by specialized physicians at
the time of diagnosis. Building on error frameworks proposed in the literature, we tested the experimental hypothesis that physicians
within a given specialty have a bias in diagnosing cases outside their own domain as being within that domain. Thirty-two board-
certiﬁed physicians from four internal medicine subspecialties worked four patient cases each. Verbal protocol analysis and general
linear modeling of the numerical data seem to conﬁrm the experimental hypothesis, indicating that specialists try to ‘‘pull’’ cases
toward their specialty. Specialists generate more diagnostic hypotheses within their domain than outside, and assign higher
probabilities to diagnoses within that domain.
 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Betsy Lehman, a Boston Globe health reporter, died
from an overdose during chemotherapy. Willie King
had the wrong leg amputated. Ben Kolb was eight years
old when he died during surgery due to a drug mixup
[1,2]. And these are just the ‘‘tip of the iceberg’’ of
medical errors [1,2].
One important type of medical error occurs at the
time of diagnosis. The popular press cites cases such as
that of Dr. Franklin K. Yee, whose abdominal pain was
diagnosed as viral gastroenteritis by a gastroenterolo-
gist, caused him to be admitted to a coronary care unit
by a cardiologist, was suspected by a nephrologist to be
the result of kidney stones, and eventually was found on
abdominal surgery to be the result of a ruptured ap-
pendix [3]. This phenomenon of diﬀerent specialists
projecting their specialties on a patient has not been
studied systematically. In the present paper, the role of
medical specialization in inducing biases that may un-* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-425-936-7329.
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doi:10.1016/S1532-0464(03)00057-1derlie some diagnostic medical errors is investigated
empirically.2. The cost of expertise
It may seem strange to talk about the costs of being
an expert, but there is increasing experimental evidence
that the beneﬁts of expertise are not without costs. The
costs of expertise can be divided into two main catego-
ries: Those related to accuracy of recall, and those re-
lated to inﬂexibility.
2.1. Accuracy of recall
Experts may outperform novices in recalling the de-
tails of a problem or text. But when the domain
knowledge of experts cannot be utilized, experts tend to
underperform novices. For example, in a study on recall
of random chessboard positions, the performance of
chess experts was slightly worse than that of novices [4].
Similarly, in a study on memory for baseball texts,
participants with high baseball knowledge recalled sig-
niﬁcantly less baseball-irrelevant propositions from a
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participants with low baseball knowledge [5].
2.2. Reduced ﬂexibility
Some of the early work on the costs of expertise was
done by Ggestalt psychologists [6–8]. Luchins argued
that experience produced an Einstellung, or mental set,
that limited the search space of subsequent problem
solving. More recent studies have shown similar results.
For example, Shiﬀrin and Schneider [9] reported that
people trained for several thousand trials to detect visual
targets among distractors in a consistent-mapping con-
dition were at a serious disadvantage when the target
and distractor sets were reversed. Wiley [10] showed that
problem solvers with a large amount of domain
knowledge are conﬁned by their knowledge to one area
of the search space—a condition that is eﬃcient if the
solution happens to fall in this area but which backﬁres
if it does not.3. Characteristics of medical expertise
There is no reason to suspect that expertise in medi-
cine is diﬀerent from expertise in any other domain. In
fact, research results have emphasized similarities (e.g.
[11–15]). The general characteristics of expertise are
summarized elsewhere [16,17] and will not be repeated
here. Some characteristics of expertise in the medical
domain that bear relevance to the present study will be
discussed.
3.1. Diagnostic reasoning mode
According to Patel and Groen [14], expert clinicians
confronted with routine cases use a data-driven (for-
ward) approach, in which diagnoses are generated from
data by applying a small set of if/then production rules
without generating intermediate hypotheses and evalu-
ating them. Less expert clinicians, such as medical stu-
dents or residents, on the other hand, tend to use a
hypothesis-driven (backward) approach, in which rea-
soning occurs backwards from a hypothesis in an at-
tempt to ﬁnd data that elucidates it [18]. This assertion is
consistent with ﬁndings in other domains such as
physics [19] and mathematics [20], and with the general
notion that in routine situations experts tend to use
highly speciﬁc problem-solving structures [21].
3.2. Experts working outside their domain
Cognitive literature holds abundant evidence that
experts excel only at their domain of expertise (see [17]
for an overview). Some of the very few studies that have
examined the performance of subspecialist physicians onproblems outside their area of specialty were done by
Patel and colleagues [22,23]. Cardiologists and endo-
crinologists were asked to read cardiology and endo-
crinology cases and to think-aloud as they were reading
them, or to recall case information and explain the un-
derlying pathophysiology. The general ﬁnding is that
experts working within their subdomain tend to use
forward strategy more, and to rely on pathophysiolog-
ical knowledge less, than experts working outside their
subdomain. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence in diagnostic ac-
curacy was found, but it is hard to make any meaningful
claim on this issue due to the small sample sizes (typi-
cally less than 10 participants total, working on one to
two cases).4. The present work
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that
prior knowledge plays a crucial role in diagnostic rea-
soning. Expert performance is a function of the orga-
nization, structure, and quality of this prior knowledge.
Further, the prior knowledge of the expert is automat-
ically and unintentionally activated—experts cannot help
being inﬂuenced by it. Therefore, it is plausible to sus-
pect that what one already knows may bias the way one
structures a problem and goes about solving it. This
‘‘bias’’ may be beneﬁcial in some cases but costly in
others. The goal of the present work is to investigate
experimentally whether the cost of this bias is mani-
fested by subspecialists working on problems that are
outside their subspecialty area. Speciﬁcally, this study is
concerned with whether physicians within a given spe-
cialty have a bias in diagnosing cases outside their own
domain as being within that domain.5. Methods
5.1. Participants
Thirty-two board-certiﬁed physicians practicing in
the Pittsburgh area were recruited for this study: eight
from each of the internal medicine subspecialties—car-
diology, hematology, and infectious diseases (ID)—and
eight internal medicine general practitioners (generalists)
who did not subspecialize. (In that which follows, we
refer to the subspecialties of cardiology, hematology,
and infectious diseases as the ‘‘subspecialties of inter-
est.’’) The participants years of experience, after ﬁn-
ishing all formal training, averaged 15.8 years (the
standard deviation was 9.9 years and the median was
15.5 years). Participants volunteered their time and did
not receive monetary compensation for participation in
the study.
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The material used in this study consists of four pa-
tient cases, chosen from a total of 36 challenging cases,
and used in studies reported elsewhere [24,25]. Each of
these four patient cases is represented in a two- to ﬁve-
page abstract prepared by an expert clinician based on
the actual patient charts. The abstracts include all the
salient history, physical examination ﬁndings, labora-
tory results, and radiological and other diagnostic
studies. They also include ample non-salient data to
avoid cueing. However, the abstracts do not include the
ﬁndings that were judged by the expert abstractor to be
gold standard or deﬁnitive ﬁndings, such as a positive
biopsy, because including such ﬁndings would render
the diagnosis trivial for clinicians.
The four challenging cases that were used in the
present study satisfy three conditions: (1) their correct
diagnoses belong, respectively, to the three subspecial-
ties of interest, plus a fourth subspecialty not repre-
sented among the experts, (2) no case is inherently
misleading, and (3) no case is inherently easily diagnosed
into one specialty exclusively.5.3. Design and procedure
Participants read the four patient cases on paper, one
after the other. The presentation sequence of the cases
was counterbalanced. For each case, the participants
viewed its abstract in three consecutive segments corre-
sponding to: chief complaint and history, physical ex-
amination, and laboratory data. Because the cases were
presented on paper, participants were able to go back to
view information from prior segments, but the instruc-
tions they were given asked them not to change the re-
sponses they provided in previous segments.
At the end of each segment, the participants were
asked to give a set of up to six diﬀerential diagnoses
along with an associated degree of belief (ranging from 0
to 100) that each diagnosis was the correct one. The
degree of belief was taken as a measure for a partici-
pants conﬁdence in the correctness of his or her answer,
and is a probability expressed as a percentage. The in-
structions speciﬁed that the numbers should add up to
100, but some participants did not follow this require-
ment. Therefore, the degrees of belief were later pro-
portionately normalized so that their sum in a
diﬀerential diagnosis set (after seeing one segment of one
case) added up to 100. The scale was also transformed
from 100 back to 1, consistent with the standard rep-
resentation of probabilities.
Participants were asked to think-aloud as they
worked the cases, and their verbal protocols were tape-
recorded and later transcribed for analysis. The experi-
menter prompted participants to think loudly or toverbalize his/her thoughts whenever there was a period
of several seconds of silence.
The independent variables in the study were:
a. The specialty of the participant: cardiology, hematol-
ogy, infectious diseases, and general medicine.
b. The specialty of the case: cardiology, hematology, in-
fectious diseases, and gastroenterology.
c. The amount of case information revealed to partici-
pants before they were asked to give a set of diﬀeren-
tial diagnoses: chief complaint and history only; the
above plus physical examination; and the above plus
lab data.
d. Whether the participant worked on a case that
matched his/her specialty (same_domain). While this
variable is subsumed under the ﬁrst two variables,
we are treating it here as a separate variable to facil-
itate analysis.
The dependent variables were:
a. The probability assigned to the correct case specialty
(P(CS)): The sum of the probabilities assigned by a
participant, after seeing a segment of a case, to all di-
agnoses that belonged to the correct specialty of the
case. For example, if a participant saw the chief com-
plaint and history of case 1 (a cardiology case) and
oﬀered a diﬀerential diagnosis of ‘‘aortic dissection,
20%’’ (which is a cardiology diagnosis), ‘‘aortic steno-
sis, 50%’’ (a cardiology diagnosis), and ‘‘hemolytic
anemia, 30%’’ (a hematology diagnosis), then P(CS)
would have been 70 to represent all the cardiology di-
agnoses in the diﬀerential.
b. The probability assigned to the correct diagnosis
(P(CD)): The probability assigned by a participant
to the correct diagnosis of a patient case.
c. The probability assigned to the participants own spe-
cialty (P(OS)): The sum of the probabilities assigned
by a participant, after seeing a segment of a case, to
all diagnoses that belonged to the participants spe-
cialty. For example, if the diﬀerential diagnosis above
was provided by a cardiologist, then P(OS) would be
70. If it was provided by a hematologist, then P(OS)
would be 30. This variable is not deﬁned or used
for the generalists.
The ﬁrst two variables reﬂect diagnostic accuracy,
with the ﬁrst being less strict than the second, as it in-
dicates the probability of being in the ‘‘general ball-
park.’’ The last variable reﬂects the degree of bias
towards ones own specialty.
To facilitate the calculation of the ﬁrst and last de-
pendent variables (P(CS) and P(OS)), each diagnosis
provided by participants was mapped to its corre-
sponding medical specialty, such as mapping aortic
stenosis to cardiology. This was done by a physician,
relying on a standard medical textbook [26]. This me-
chanical task boils down to noting the title of the
chapter in which the diagnosis is discussed in the text-
book.
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ticipants specialty biases the participants answers by
inﬂuencing the probability assigned to the participants
own specialty. Speciﬁcally, participant specialty is re-
lated to P(OS), even when controlled for the case. In
addition, participants assign a higher collective proba-
bility to hypotheses within their domain of expertise
than hypotheses outside their domain.6. Results
In the following sections, we present (a) data from the
verbal protocols, (b) ANOVA results of the probabilities
assigned to diﬀerent specialties, and (c) analyses using a
generalized linear model.
6.1. Verbal protocol analyses
6.1.1. Generation of diagnostic hypotheses
Using the verbal protocols that participants gener-
ated as they worked through the experimental cases, we
extracted all the diagnostic hypotheses mentioned in
these protocols and mapped them to their specialties
using a standard medical textbook [26]. This mechanical
task boils down to noting the title of the chapter inFig. 1. The number of diagnostic hypotheses generated by participants
in the verbal protocols for all cases.
Table 1
Log odds, standard error, and p values for the hypothesis that the number of
similar
Domain of participants Domain of diagnoses
Cardiology Hematology
Cardiology Infectious diseases
Cardiology Gastroenterology
Hematology Cardiology
Hematology Infectious diseases
Hematology Gastroenterology
Infectious diseases Cardiology
Infectious diseases Hematology
Infectious diseases Gastroenterologywhich the diagnosis is discussed in the textbook. We
then performed a simple counting of these hypotheses. If
the same hypothesis was mentioned repeatedly by a
participant for the same case, only the ﬁrst utterance
was counted. Fig. 1 shows the number of diagnostic
hypotheses from each medical specialty that was gen-
erated by each group of specialists in the study while
working through the four cases.
Note the peak that indicates a possible correlation
between the domain of the participant and the domain
of the diagnostic hypotheses that were generated.
For each participants specialty, we calculated the log
odds of a hypothesis within the participants specialty vs
outside the specialty, for each of the three opposing
specialties. We also calculated the standard errors and p
values for the hypothesis that the odds are even. For
example, for cardiologists we calculated the log odds of
a hypothesis within cardiology vs within hematology,
along with the standard error and p value for the hy-
pothesis that the number of diagnoses in cardiology and
in hematology is the same. We then repeated this for the
other diagnostic domains and for the other participant
domains. Table 1 shows the results of these calculations.
Note that all p values are highly signiﬁcant, indicating
that participants generated more diagnostic hypotheses
within their domain than outside their domain.
6.1.2. Cues used in hypothesis generation
For every new diagnostic hypothesis generated by
specialists, we noted whether the generation was based
on a single cue in the patient case or multiple cues.
Examples about generating a hypothesis based on a
single cue include: ‘‘Hes got a very low MCV, which is
72. [. . .] You see that with um, iron deﬁciency anemia,’’
and ‘‘Weight loss always makes you concerned about
cancer.’’ Examples about generating hypotheses based
on multiple cues include: ‘‘With him hemolyzing and
with normal coags, and having thrombocytopenia, um,
Id wonder about the possibility of um, TTP,’’ and ‘‘In
terms of diagnosis probably ah, with the history of
marijuana use, with a murmur, with a temperature you
are now thinking in terms of endocarditis.’’ There wasdiagnoses in the participants domain and that in the other domains is
Log odd Standard error p value
1.089 0.198 <0.001
0.765 0.177 <0.001
1.480 0.231 <0.001
0.890 0.175 <0.001
0.730 0.166 <0.001
1.285 0.203 <0.001
1.291 0.197 <0.001
1.354 0.201 <0.001
1.420 0.207 <0.001
Table 2
The number of cues as a basis for generating hypotheses
Basis of generating new hypotheses Number of hypotheses in cases matching
participants specialty
Number of hypotheses in cases not
matching participants specialty
Single cue 29 190
Multiple cue 61 45
Cant Determine 128 334
Total 218 569
A. Hashem et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 61–69 65enough information in the protocols to allow for clas-
sifying 42% of the hypotheses into these two cue cate-
gories, and the remaining hypotheses were classiﬁed into
a ‘‘Cant Determine’’ category. Table 2 shows the results
of this classiﬁcation.
We calculated the log odds of a single-cue hypothesis
within the participants specialties vs a multiple-cue
hypothesis, along with the standard error and p value
for the experimental hypothesis that the odds are even.
We repeated this for the single-cue vs multiple-cue hy-
potheses in cases outside the participants specialties.
The results indicated that participants are more likely to
base hypotheses on multiple cues when working on cases
within their specialty (log odds¼ 0.744, p < 0:001), and
to base them on single cues when working on cases
outside their specialty (log odds¼ 1.44, p < 0:001).
6.1.3. Anomalies
For every new hypothesis generated by specialists, we
noted whether there was an indication in the verbal
protocols that the specialist recognized ‘‘an anomaly,’’
or recognized that the hypothesis generated did not
quite ﬁt the patient case being examined. Examples
about anomaly recognition include: ‘‘She could have a
urinary tract infection, but it sounds more like this is not
a clean catch,’’ and ‘‘He could have bacterial meningitis.
It doesnt sound like it, but he could.’’ We then noted,
for each instance of an anomaly, whether the specialist
kept the anomalous hypothesis in the ﬁnal diﬀerential
diagnosis list or not. The results can be found in Table 3.
Chi-squared analysis indicated that specialists are
more likely to recognize anomalies in the hypotheses
they generated when working on cases matching their
specialty than they are when working on cases outside
their specialty (v2ð1Þ ¼ 16:31, p < 0:001). However,
once recognized, an anomalous hypothesis is equally
likely to be kept in the ﬁnal diﬀerential diagnosis list forTable 3
Instances of anomaly recognition
Cases matching par
Total number of hypotheses 218
Instances of anomaly recognition 27
Hypotheses kept despite anomaly recognition 18cases matching or not matching the participants spe-
cialty (v2ð1Þ ¼ 0:01, p ¼ 0:92).
6.1.4. Summary of protocol analysis results
In summary, the protocol analysis showed that par-
ticipants generated more diagnostic hypotheses within
their domain of expertise than outside. It also showed
that when specialists work on cases within their domain
of expertise, they are more likely to base their hypoth-
eses on multiple cues as opposed to single cues, and are
more likely to recognize anomalies in the hypotheses
they generate. However, an anomaly recognized does
not necessarily translate into a hypothesis rejected.
6.2. ANOVA results for the probabilities assigned to
diﬀerent specialties
We calculated the probabilities assigned by each
group of specialists to each of the subspecialties of in-
terest plus gastroenterology. For example, if a cardiol-
ogist provided six diagnoses after seeing a patient case,
two of which were in the subspecialty of hematology,
then the probabilities assigned to these two diagnoses
were added to generate one probability assigned by this
participant to hematology. The averages of these prob-
abilities are shown in Table 4. Table 4 also shows the
ANOVA results for the hypothesis that the probabilities
assigned to the diﬀerent specialties by each group of
specialists are equal. The last column in each row shows
the minimum diﬀerence per Scheﬀes test at the 0.05
level for two probabilities in that row to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent.
The analysis indicates that, with the exception of
hematologists, participants are inclined to assign higher
probabilities to their own specialty than other special-
ties, and that this inclination decreases as more case
information is revealed.ticipants specialty Cases not matching participants specialty
569
25
17
Table 4
The average probabilities assigned to diﬀerent specialties by each group of participants after each case segment
Participant
specialty
Case
segment
Average
probability
assigned to
cardiology
Average
probability
assigned to
hematology
Average
probability
assigned
to infectious
diseases
Average
probability
assigned to
gastroenterology
F p value Scheﬀes
critical
diﬀerence
at the
0.05 level
Cardiology 1 0.44 0.04 0.16 0.14 14.68 <0.001 0.09
Cardiology 2 0.48 0.03 0.20 0.09 16.64 <0.001 0.10
Cardiology 3 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.14 1.13 0.341 0.10
Hem 1 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.94 0.425 0.08
Hem 2 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.910 0.09
Hem 3 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.18 4.99 0.003 0.10
ID 1 0.19 0.03 0.39 0.17 9.79 <0.001 0.09
ID 2 0.17 0.07 0.43 0.12 11.77 <0.001 0.09
ID 3 0.09 0.28 0.31 0.17 2.93 0.037 0.11
The table also shows the ANOVA F and p values for the hypothesis that the probabilities in each line are equal. Scheﬀes critical diﬀerence
between the averages appears in the last column.
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We built a generalized linear model to ﬁt the data
using quasi-likelihood. The goal of this task was to ﬁnd
a model that accurately simulates the experimental data
and helps to identify the signiﬁcant predictors for each
of the three dependent variables in the study: the
probability assigned to the correct case specialty
(P(CS)), the probability assigned to the correct diagnosis
(P(CD)), and the probability assigned to the partici-
pants own specialty (P(OS)). The model will serve as a
tool to establish relationships between these dependent
variables and other variables.
Because the dependent variables were the assigned
probabilities, it was appropriate to treat the data as
pseudo-binomial observations and to perform a linear
logistic analysis. However, the data were found to be
signiﬁcantly under-dispersed. Hence, it was necessary to
performquasi-likelihood estimationwith binomial family
link functions and estimate the dispersion parameters
[27]. First, for the task of variable selection, exploratory
univariate analyses were performed. The Kruskal–Wallis
rank sum test [28] was used to test for potential eﬀects
on the three dependent variables by the following vari-
ables: specialty of the case, specialty of the participant, the
sequential order in which a case was presented to partic-
ipants, the amount of case information revealed to
participants, and whether the participant was working on
a case that matched his or her specialty. This test was
used because the distributions of the three dependent
variables were signiﬁcantly non-normal. Kendalls rank
correlation tau [29] was used to test for signiﬁcant corre-
lation between the participants years of experience
and the three dependent variables. The statistical package
S-Plus was used to perform all the analyses.
The univariate analysis highlighted four potential
covariates: amount of information revealed, case spe-
cialty, participant specialty, and whether the partici-pants specialty and the case specialty match. Next
forward and backward stepwise variable selection pro-
cedures were employed to generate plausible multivari-
ate models for the three dependent variables. Interaction
and quadratic terms were added to the variable set to
check the linearity and additivity model assumptions.
The following model ﬁts the experimental data ade-
quately, as conﬁrmed by deviance residual inspection
and leverage and inﬂuence diagnostics
log
p
1 p
 
¼ b0 þ
Xp
i¼1
bixi; ð1Þ
where:
• p is the particular probability, or dependent variable,
being modeled.
• xi are the covariates. They take a value of 1 when the
circumstances being modeled match the entry in the
‘‘parameter’’ column in Tables 5, 6, or 7, for P(CS),
P(CD), or P(OS), respectively. Otherwise, they take a
value of 0.
• i represents a line number in Tables 5, 6, or 7. p rep-
resents the largest i in these tables.
• b0 (the intercept) and bi are parameters for the model
whose estimates can be found in Tables 5–7.
The following subsections provide more details about
how the model applies to the three dependent variables.
The important message to take from these subsections
concerns which variables are signiﬁcant predictors for
each of the dependent variables, as this will be taken as
evidence for a relationship between the predictor and the
predicted variable. We have pointed out these predictors
in the corresponding subsections, and the implications
are addressed in Section 7.
6.3.1. Modeling the probability assigned to the correct
specialty (P(CS))
Table 5 provides the parameter estimates for the
probability assigned to the correct specialty (P(CS))
Table 5
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and t values for Wald test that parameter¼ 0 for the P(CS) model
i Parameter Estimate (bi) Standard error t value t value signiﬁcant?
0 Intercept (b0) )0.126 0.212 )0.594 No
1 Case specialty¼Gastroenterology 0.421 0.221 1.909 No
2 Case specialty¼Hematology )2.872 0.322 )8.932 Yes
3 Case specialty¼ Infectious diseases )1.119 0.229 )4.883 Yes
4 Same_domain¼YES 1.458 0.201 7.268 Yes
5 Information revealed¼All )0.566 0.271 )2.090 Yes
6 Participant specialty¼Hematology )0.123 0.200 )0.616 No
7 Participant specialty¼ Infectious diseases )0.026 0.195 )0.126 No
8 Participant specialty¼General medicine 0.411 0.205 2.003 Yes
9 Case specialty¼Gastroenterology
information revealed¼All
1.049 0.386 2.721 Yes
10 Case specialty¼Hematology information
revealed¼All
3.652 0.452 8.080 Yes
11 Case specialty¼ Infectious diseases
information revealed¼All
0.876 0.390 2.248 Yes
Table 6
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and t values for the Wald test that parameter¼ 0 for the P(CD) model
i Parameter Estimate (bi) Standard error t value t value signiﬁcant?
0 Intercept (b0) )4.521 0.399 )11.343 Yes
1 Case specialty¼Gastroenterology 0.976 0.421 2.317 Yes
2 Case specialty ¼Hematology )2.756 1.017 )2.710 Yes
3 Case specialty ¼ Infectious diseases )2.434 0.794 )3.065 Yes
4 Same_domain¼YES 2.343 0.375 6.250 Yes
5 Participant specialty¼Hematology 0.236 0.350 0.673 No
6 Participant specialty¼ Infectious diseases 0.795 0.360 2.209 Yes
7 Participant specialty¼General medicine 1.546 0.344 4.491 Yes
8 Case specialty¼Cardiology
information revealed¼All
)0.473 0.564 )0.838 No
9 Case specialty¼Gastroenterology
information revealed¼All
2.054 0.313 6.563 Yes
10 Case specialty¼Hematology
information revealed¼All
4.650 0.987 4.712 Yes
11 Case specialty¼ Infectious diseases
information revealed¼All
)0.120 1.264 )0.095 No
Table 7
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and t values for the Wald test that parameter¼ 0 for the P(OS) model
i Parameter Estimate (bi) Standard error t value t value signiﬁcant?
0 Intercept (b0) )0.593 0.225 )2.632 Yes
1 Same_domain¼YES 1.549 0.203 7.620 Yes
2 Information revealed¼Most 0.734 0.177 4.146 Yes
3 Participant specialty¼Hematology )0.700 0.214 )3.268 Yes
4 Participant specialty¼ Infectious diseases )0.215 0.204 )1.054 No
5 Case specialty¼Gastroenterology )0.592 0.254 )2.330 Yes
6 Case specialty ¼Hematology )0.428 0.234 )1.828 No
7 Case specialty¼ Infectious diseases )0.579 0.242 )2.395 Yes
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values for Wald test that the parameter is zero.
ANOVA showed that the signiﬁcant predictors for
the probability assigned to the correct specialty were the
case specialty, whether the case specialty and the par-
ticipant specialty match (same_domain) and whether
participants viewed the third portion of the case infor-mation (information revealed¼ all), and the participant
specialty.
6.3.2. Modeling the probability assigned to the correct
diagnosis (P(CD))
Table 6 provides the parameter estimates for the
probability assigned to the correct diagnosis (P(CD))
Table 8
A matrix showing the signiﬁcant predictors for the three dependent variables
Case specialty Participant specialty Same_domain Amount of information revealed
P(CS) X X X X
P(CD) X X X X
P(OS) X X X
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t values for Wald test that a parameter is zero.
ANOVA showed that the signiﬁcant predictors for the
probability assigned to the correct diagnosis were the case
specialty, participant specialty, whether the case specialty
and the participant specialty match (same_domain), and
whether participants viewed the third portion of the case
information (information revealed¼ all).
6.3.3. Modeling the probability assigned to the partici-
pant’s own specialty (P(OS))
Table 7 provides the parameter estimates for proba-
bility assigned to the participants own specialty (P(OS))
model. It also includes the standard errors and the t
values for the Wald test that the parameter is zero.
ANOVA showed that the signiﬁcant predictors for the
probability assigned to the participants own specialty
were whether the case specialty and the participant spe-
cialty matched (same_domain), whether participants
viewed the second portion of the case information (in-
formation revealed¼most), and the participants spe-
cialty. A weak predictor is the case specialty.
6.3.4. Summary of the generalized linear model results
Based on the previous analysis, we can build the
following table (Table 8) to show which variables are
signiﬁcant predictors for the three dependent variables
P(CS), P(CD), and P(OS).
It is important to note that each of these predictors
was signiﬁcant, even when controlling for the other
predictors.
The generalized linear model, then, indicates that
diagnostic accuracy (in the weak sense of identifying the
correct case specialty and in the strong sense of identi-
fying the correct diagnosis) is predicted by the case
specialty, the participant specialty, the amount of in-
formation revealed, and whether the participants spe-
cialty and case specialty match. The model also indicates
that the tendency to identify a case as belonging to ones
own specialty is predicted by the participant specialty,
the amount of information revealed, and whether the
participants specialty and the case specialty match.7. Discussion
The main point of this study was to examine whether
physicians with a given specialty have a bias in diag-nosing cases outside their own domain as being within
that domain. The answer appears to be yes, and several
pieces of evidence support this view:
a. As can be seen from Table 8, a participants specialty
is related to the probability assigned by that partici-
pant to his or her own specialty when diagnosing a
case, even when we control for the case. This estab-
lishes a relationship between the specialty and the
participants answer.
b. From Table 4, we see that participants assign a higher
collective probability to hypotheses within their do-
main of expertise than outside this domain (except
for hematologists). Therefore, it appears that a partic-
ipants specialty biases the participants answers to a
case diagnosis by inﬂuencing the probability assigned
to the participants own specialty.
c. From Table 1, we can see that in the verbal protocols,
participants generate many more diagnostic hypothe-
ses within their domain than outside their domain,
further indicating a bias toward ones specialty.
This conﬁrms the experimental hypothesis, that there
is a bias toward ones specialty.
Using Rasmussens skill-rule-knowledge (SRK)
framework for understanding human error [30], we can
say that because of the automation that results from
years of experience with cases within ones specialty,
many rules or schemas at the intermediate level of per-
formance are acquired to codify expertise. Many of
these rules are primed to be quickly activated, even with
minimal information, and sometimes prematurely [31].
This premature activation leads to the generation of
hypotheses within ones specialty, as evidenced by the
verbal protocols ﬁndings, and to assigning higher
probabilities to these hypotheses.
The protocol analysis showed that when specialists
work on cases within their domain of expertise, they are
more likely to base their hypotheses on multiple cues as
opposed to single cues, and are more likely to recognize
anomalies in the hypotheses they generate. This points
to the elaborate knowledge structures to represent an
experts domain and to the impoverished knowledge
structures representing the other domains, and is con-
sistent with ﬁndings in other ﬁelds such as chess [4,32]
and physics [19,33]. The use of only single cues outside
the specialties of expertise suggests that simple IF-
THEN conditional rules are being utilized, whereas
experts working within their specialties are likely us-
ing ‘‘second-order’’ interactive cues [33]. That is, for
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actions), but rather, their interactions may suggest sec-
ond-order cues.
One can see from Table 8 that diagnostic accuracy is
related to the participants specialty, indicating that par-
ticipants from some specialties are more diagnostically
accurate than others. Looking at the line associated with
i ¼ 8 in Table 5, and i ¼ 7 in Table 6, one can see that
generalists are overall signiﬁcantly better diagnosticians
than the baseline. It is particularly interesting to note that
generalists do better than the baseline, whereas specialists
tend to be biased toward their own specialty.
This study had several limitations. The number of
cases used (four) is relatively small. Although the ﬁnd-
ings in this study were present despite controlling for the
case, it is possible that diﬀerent cases would show dif-
ferent results. Also, participants were largely aﬃliated
with an academic medical center, and therefore the re-
sults may not generalize to other practice settings. The
case material used in this study, although comprehensive
and based on real patient charts, was not the complete
patient record and was not the same as the real patient.
In practice, physicians typically have access to more
information about their patients than the summaries
provided for this study. In addition, if the participants
were examining real patients under their care, their
motivation, and subsequently their performance, might
have been diﬀerent.References
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